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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Slaughterhouse Cases,1 Bradwell v. Illinois,2 and Cruikshank v. 
United States,3 which were all decided between 1873 and 1876, were the 
first cases in which the Supreme Court interpreted the 14th Amendment.  
The reasoning and holdings of the Supreme Court in those cases have 
affected constitutional interpretation in ways which are both profound 
and unfortunate.  The conclusions that the Court drew about the meaning 
of the 14th Amendment shortly after its adoption were contrary to the 
intent of the framers of that Amendment and a betrayal of the sacrifices 
which had been made by the people of that period.  In each case, the 
Court perverted the meaning of the Constitution in ways that reverberate 
down to the present day. 
In these cases the Court ruled upon several critical aspects of 14th 
Amendment jurisprudence, including (1) Whether the 14th Amendment 
prohibits the States from interfering with our fundamental rights; (2) 
How the equality of different groups should be determined; and (3) How 
 
* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor of 
Law, University of Akron School of Law.  I wish to thank Richard Aynes and Elizabeth Reilly both 
for their friendship and for their guidance in the study of constitutional law. 
 1. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 2. 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 3. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
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much power Congress has to protect the civil and political rights of 
American citizens – in particular, whether the 14th Amendment 
authorizes Congress to enact legislation to prevent mobs or other private 
individuals from violating people’s fundamental rights.  The Court 
narrowly construed the constitutional principles of liberty, equality, and 
the power of Congress to protect civil rights. 
II.  SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES 
In Slaughterhouse Cases the Supreme Court came to a 
commonsense result – the Court upheld a law that concentrated all of the 
butchering business in the City of New Orleans to a location south of the 
city limits in an area controlled by a state-created monopoly.4  The Court 
found the law to be a constitutional exercise of the police power of the 
State, a reasonable regulation protecting the public health.5 And the 
Court could have rested its opinion solely upon this finding, as even the 
Lochner Court would likely have upheld the law on those grounds.6  But 
the Slaughterhouse Court went much further.  In doing so, the Court 
practically eviscerated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th 
Amendment. 
The Supreme Court ruled in Slaughterhouse that the butchers had 
no constitutional claim under the 14th Amendment against the law 
because the constitutional right that they were asserting – the right to 
earn a living at an honest occupation – although a fundamental right, 
was not a “privilege or immunity of national citizenship” within the 
meaning of the 14th Amendment.7  The key to the reasoning of the Court 
on this point was that there is a distinction between state citizenship and 
national citizenship.  The Court stated, “[i]t is quite clear, then, that there 
 
 4. See Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 59-63 (setting forth and upholding the Louisiana statute 
creating the monopoly and designating the area where butchering could occur). 
 5. See id. at 61-65 (discussing the “police power” of the state to enact laws protective of the 
public health); id. at 63 (“The regulation of the place and manner of conducting the slaughtering of 
animals, and the business of butchering within a city, and the inspection of the animals to be killed 
for meat, and of the meat afterwards, are among the most necessary and frequent exercises of this 
power.”). 
 6. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (striking down a law prohibiting bakers 
from working more than sixty hours per week).  The Court stated: 
[W]e think that such a law as this, although passed in the assumed exercise of the police 
power, and as relating to the public health, or the health of the employees named, is not 
within that power, and is invalid.  The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a 
health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals . . . . 
Id. 
 7. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 73-74. 
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is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which 
are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different 
characteristics or circumstances in the individual.”8  The Court then 
reasoned that our fundamental rights do not arise from the fact of 
American citizenship; rather they arise from our status as citizens of the 
several states.9  In reaching this conclusion the Court relied upon a pre-
14th Amendment case, Corfield v. Coryell,10 in which Judge Bushrod 
Washington had defined the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
several states as being “those privileges and immunities which are, in 
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all 
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by citizens 
of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their 
becoming free, independent, and sovereign,”11 and as including at least 
the following: “Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and 
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”12 
Citing Corfield, the Slaughterhouse Court identified our 
“fundamental” rights in the following terms: 
The description, when taken to include others not named, but which 
are of the same general character, embraces nearly every civil right for 
the establishment and protection of which organized government is 
instituted.  They are, in the language of Judge Washington, those rights 
which the [sic] fundamental.  Throughout his opinion, they are spoken 
of as rights belonging to the individual as a citizen of a State.  They are 
so spoken of in the constitutional provision which he was construing.  
And they have always been held to be the class of rights which the 
State governments were created to establish and secure.13 
The Slaughterhouse Court asked rhetorically, “[w]as it the purpose 
of the fourteenth amendment [sic], by the simple declaration that no 
State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security 
and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the 
States to the Federal government?”14  To the majority of the Court, the 
 
 8. Id. at 74. 
 9. Id. at 74-76. 
 10. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
 11. Id. at 551, quoted in Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 76. 
 12. Id. at 551-52, quoted in Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 76. 
 13. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 76. 
 14. Id. at 77. 
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answer was “No,” but legal scholars almost unanimously agree with the 
four dissenters that the Court answered that question wrong.15 
In reaching this result the Court ignored the straightforward 
language of the 14th Amendment.  The first words of the Amendment 
state: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States . . . .16 
The Framers of the 14th Amendment made state citizenship 
secondary to national citizenship.  They provided that all persons born in 
the United States are American citizens, and that Americans are citizens 
of whatever state they happen to reside in.  Yet in Slaughterhouse the 
Supreme Court turned that unmistakable hierarchy on its head, and as a 
result they consigned the fundamental freedoms that Americans 
rightfully regard as their birthright to the dubious protection of the 
States.  After Slaughterhouse all of our fundamental rights – freedom of 
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, 
and all of the other privileges and immunities set forth in the Bill of 
Rights, as well as all of our unenumerated rights, would thenceforward 
be subject to the whims and prejudices of state constitutions, state laws, 
state and local police, state courts, and state juries. 
In placing state citizenship over national citizenship, the 
Slaughterhouse Court reflected the view of John C. Calhoun.  In 1833, 
Calhoun had equated the idea of a citizen of the United States to a 
“citizen of the world, . . . a perfect nondescript,”17 and stated that our 
 
 15. Id. at 78.  See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 627-29 (1994) 
(collecting views of scholars on the Slaughterhouse Court’s interpretation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 17. See 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 242 (Richard Krenner Crallé ed.) (1888).  In 
objecting to the Revenue Bill pending before the Senate, Calhoun said: 
In what manner are we citizens of the United States?  Without weakening the patriotic 
feeling with which, I trust, it will ever be uttered.  If by citizen of the United States he 
means a citizen at large, one whose citizenship extends to the entire geographical limits 
of the country, without having a local citizenship in some State or territory, a sort of 
citizen of the world, all I have to say is, that such a citizen would be a perfect 
nondescript; that not a single individual of this description can be found in the entire 
mass of our population. 
Id. at 242-43. 
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rights depend upon being the citizen of a State or territory.18  Dissenting 
in Slaughterhouse, Justice Stephen J. Field excoriated the majority for 
adopting Calhoun’s view of the relative importance of state and national 
citizenship.19  In the words of Charles L. Black, Jr., the Slaughterhouse 
Court “surrendered to Calhoun.”20  Black explains: 
The fact (an amazing one in view of the intervening great Civil War 
for national unity), is that, on the level of our highest values, this 
Slaughterhouse holding is a very close fit with the banefully “classic” 
doctrines of John C. Calhoun, the great heresiarch, on the relative 
importance and worth of national citizenship (not very much) and state 
citizenship (nearly everything).21 
Even more seriously, the reasoning of the Court in Slaughterhouse 
making our fundamental rights dependent upon state citizenship and 
state institutions allowed future segregationists to base their political 
philosophy upon the theory of “states’ rights.”  George Wallace could 
not have argued, in his January 1963 inauguration address as Governor 
of Alabama, that he had the power to protect and defend “segregation 
today . . . segregation tomorrow . . . segregation forever”22 unless he 
believed that such a question was a matter of state citizenship.  
 
 18. See id. at 243.  Calhoun stated: 
Notwithstanding all the pomp and display of eloquence on the occasion, every citizen is 
a citizen of some State or territory, and, as such, under an express provision of the 
constitution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; 
and it is in this, and in no other sense, that we are citizens of the United States. 
Id. at 243. 
 19. See Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 95 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 20. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 32 (1997). 
 21. Id.  More colorfully, Black stated: 
This denial to each of the States of the right to choose its own citizens might be looked 
on now as just another nail in the coffin of the theory that our states are “sovereign.”  
That coffin can use all the nails it can get, because it yawns every now and then, on some 
inauspicious midnight, to give up its undead, clad perhaps in the senatorial toga of 
Calhoun. 
Id. at 24. 
 22. See George C. Wallace, Governor, 1963 Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963), available at 
http://www.archives.state.al.us/govs_list/inauguralspeech.html.  Governor Wallace said: 
Today I have stood, where once Jefferson Davis stood, and took an oath to my people.  It 
is very appropriate then that from this Cradle of the Confederacy, this very Heart of the 
Great Anglo-Saxon Southland, that today we sound the drum for freedom as have our 
generations of forebears before us done, time and time again through history.  Let us rise 
to the call of freedom-loving blood that is in us and send our answer to the tyranny that 
clanks its chains upon the South.  In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod 
this earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny . . . 
and I say . . . segregation today . . . segregation tomorrow . . . segregation forever. 
Id. 
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Similarly, three months later, those who denounced the civil rights 
activities of Martin Luther King, Jr., and other members of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference in Birmingham, Alabama, as the work 
of “outsiders,”23 relied upon the implicit belief that only Alabama 
institutions had the right and the power to address matters of 
constitutional importance in the State of Alabama. 
Here is a portion of King’s response to this argument: 
I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states.  I 
cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens 
in Birmingham.  Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.  
We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single 
garment of destiny.  Whatever affects one directly, affects all 
indirectly.  Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, 
provincial “outside agitator” idea.  Anyone who lives inside the United 
States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its 
bounds.24 
Whether it be Daniel Worth circulating Hinton Helper’s Impending 
Crisis25 or Viola Liuzzo responding to the events at Edmond Pettus 
 
 23. See Statement by Alabama Clergymen on Racial Problems in Alabama (Apr. 12, 1963), 
available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/frequentdocs/clergy.pdf (“We are now confronted 
by a series of demonstrations by some of our Negro citizens, directed and led in part by outsiders.”). 
 24. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available at 
http://www.mlkonline.net/jail.html.  King continued: 
I think I should indicate why I am here in Birmingham, since you have been influenced 
by the view which argues against “outsiders coming in.”  I have the honor of serving as 
president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization operating in 
every southern state, with headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.  We have some eighty five 
affiliated organizations across the South, and one of them is the Alabama Christian 
Movement for Human Rights.  Frequently we share staff, educational and financial 
resources with our affiliates.  Several months ago the affiliate here in Birmingham asked 
us to be on call to engage in a nonviolent direct action program if such were deemed 
necessary.  We readily consented, and when the hour came we lived up to our promise.  
So I, along with several members of my staff, am here because I was invited here.  I am 
here because I have organizational ties here. 
 
But more basically, I am in Birmingham because injustice is here.  Just as the prophets 
of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their “thus saith the Lord” far 
beyond the boundaries of their home towns, and just as the Apostle Paul left his village 
of Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco-Roman 
world, so am I compelled to carry the gospel of freedom beyond my own home town.  
Like Paul, I must constantly respond to the Macedonian call for aid. 
Id. 
 25. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: 
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 289-95 (2000) (describing the 
trials and convictions of Daniel Worth in North Carolina for circulating Helper’s anti-slavery book, 
6
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Bridge,26 Americans have both the right and the moral duty to protest 
fundamental injustice anywhere in the United States, because these are 
matters of national citizenship, not state citizenship.  Yet even today, the 
misconception that the States should have the final word in defining our 
fundamental rights holds influence in some quarters.  During the recent 
presidential campaign, in an interview with veteran television journalist 
Katie Couric, Republican Vice-Presidential nominee Governor Sarah 
Palin expresses both her belief in the right to privacy and her 
understanding that the parameters of that right should be determined by 
the individual states: 
Couric: Do you think there’s an inherent right to privacy in the 
Constitution? 
 
Palin: I do.  Yeah, I do. 
 
Couric: The cornerstone of Roe v. Wade. 
 
Palin: I do.  And I believe that individual states can best handle what 
the people within the different constituencies in the 50 states would 
like to see their will ushered in an issue like that.27 
The immediate and principal consequence of the Court’s ruling in 
Slaughterhouse was to remove the Privileges and Immunities Clause as 
the safe harbor of our fundamental rights.  But Americans proved 
reluctant to believe that the Constitution afforded no remedy when the 
States violate fundamental rights.  The task of preserving our substantive 
rights against state injustice eventually fell to the Due Process Clause of 
the 14th Amendment.  Later in the 19th century, the Supreme Court 
turned to the Due Process Clause as the textual home of our fundamental 
rights.  As semantically awkward and historically inaccurate as the 
choice of the Due Process Clause was, the word “liberty” nevertheless 
shone brightly there, and the Court began the long, slow process of 
“incorporating” our substantive fundamental rights into the Fourteenth 
 
events that Curtis calls “a crucial part of the background of the much disputed history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 26. See generally MARY STANTON, FROM SELMA TO SORROW: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF 
VIOLA LIUZZO (1998) (describing the life of a Detroit housewife who was killed in Alabama in 
March 1965, as a result of her civil rights activities). 
 27. Interview by Katie Couric with Joe Biden and Sarah Palin, U.S. Vice-Presidential 
Nominees, (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/01 
/eveningnews/main4493062.shtml. 
7
Huhn: The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
HUHN_COPYFORPRINTER_FINAL.DOC 6/30/2009  3:35 PM 
1058 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1051 
Amendment – defining the nature and the scope of the rights that are 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”28 
Supreme Court Justices have rightfully objected that neither the text 
nor the history of the Due Process Clause justifies the theory of 
“substantive due process.”  For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut 
Justice Potter Stewart dissented for the following reason: 
We are told that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is not, as such, the “guide” in this case.  With that much I agree.  There 
is no claim that this law [prohibiting the use of birth control], duly 
enacted by the Connecticut Legislature, is unconstitutionally vague.  
There is no claim that the appellants were denied any of the elements 
of procedural due process at their trial, so as to make their convictions 
constitutionally invalid.  And, as the Court says, the day has long 
passed since the Due Process Clause was regarded as a proper 
instrument for determining “the wisdom, need, and propriety” of state 
laws.29 
Eight years later in Roe v. Wade Justice Stewart changed his view 
and recognized the doctrine of substantive process,30 yet even today, 
some justices still maintain the illegitimacy of the concept.  For 
example, Justice Antonin Scalia has stated his belief that the Due 
Process Clause protects only procedural, not substantive rights: “The 
text of the Due Process Clause does not protect individuals against 
deprivations of liberty simpliciter.  It protects them against deprivations 
of liberty ‘without due process of law.’”31 
In hindsight it should not be surprising that the first substantive due 
process right recognized by the Supreme Court a century ago was 
 
 28. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (“In these and other 
situations immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific 
pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, 
and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states.”). 
 29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 528 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).  Speaking of the 
Court’s decision in Griswold striking down a Connecticut law making it unlawful to use birth 
control, Justice Stewart stated: 
[I]t was clear to me then, and it is equally clear to me now, that the Griswold decision 
can be rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut statute substantively 
invaded the ‘liberty’ that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  As so understood, Griswold stands as one in a long line of pre-Skrupa 
cases decided under the doctrine of substantive due process, and I now accept it as such. 
Id. at 167-68. 
 31. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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“liberty of contract.”32  In this individualistic nation of self-sufficient 
farmers and tradesmen, where government regulation was largely 
unknown, with a frontier that took three centuries to move from the 
beachheads along the Atlantic coast to the interior of Alaska – a frontier 
where the existence of government itself was barely felt – in this country 
of small farmers, ranchers, small businessmen, and adventurers, we 
might rationally expect an economic philosophy of laissez faire to arise.  
That it did not disappear with the erection of mills in Lawrence and 
Lowell, or even the rise of the robber barons, is testament to the fact that 
values emerge from the society in which they are born and they do not 
necessarily die with that society – they may live on past their appointed 
time.33  “Liberty of contract” did not expire until 1937 at the height of 
the Great Depression and the commencement of Roosevelt’s second 
term.34 
What is surprising – what should be surprising – is that the 
Supreme Court took so long to recognize and protect the non-economic 
political and social rights of American citizens.  Even the specific 
provisions of the Bill of Rights listing the privileges and immunities of 
criminal defendants were not automatically applied against the States by 
 
 32. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (striking down a Louisiana statute 
attempting to regulate the sale of insurance by a New York company and stating, “In the privilege 
of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling property, must be 
embraced the right to make all proper contracts in relation thereto.”); see also BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 179-82 (1993) (describing “Due Process and 
Liberty of Contract”). 
 33. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-64 
(1992) (discussing how it was proper for the Court to overrule the doctrines of  “separate but equal” 
and “liberty of contract” in light of new facts or new understandings of fact).  The Court stated: 
West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed 
from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional 
resolutions.  Each case was comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts that the 
country could understand, or had come to understand already, but which the Court of an 
earlier day, as its own declarations disclosed, had not been able to perceive.  As the 
decisions were thus comprehensible they were also defensible, not merely as the 
victories of one doctrinal school over another by dint of numbers (victories though they 
were), but as applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not been seen by 
the Court before.  In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed 
circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could 
accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitutional 
duty. 
Id. at 863-64. 
 34. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“In each case the violation 
alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of 
contract.  What is this freedom?  The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”). 
9
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the Court, as the Framers of the 14th Amendment so clearly intended.35  
Instead, the Court took decades to decide whether each of those specific 
guarantees should be considered inherent to 14th Amendment Due 
Process.  Ever so slowly, the Court came to recognize that the States, no 
less than the United States government, should be obedient to the right 
to counsel,36 the right to silence,37 the right to a speedy trial,38 the right to 
a trial by jury,39 and freedom from unreasonable or warrantless 
searches.40 
The Court labored even longer to begin defining the enumerated 
and unenumerated substantive rights of personal autonomy, what the 
Declaration of Independence calls “the pursuit of happiness,”41 and that 
is protected by the word “liberty” in the Constitution.42  The Supreme 
Court first struck down a law because it interfered with the rights of 
 
 35. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting) (contending 
that one of the chief purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to make the Bill of Rights 
applicable against the States, and assembling historical evidence in support of that proposition); see 
also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). 
 36. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
 37. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment right to be free of compelled 
self-incrimination). 
 38. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
and public trial). 
 39. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial). 
 40. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to have illegally seized evidence excluded from 
evidence at trial). 
 41. In a number of decisions from different eras, the Supreme Court has echoed the language 
of the Declaration.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“That the people have an 
original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall 
most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been 
erected.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“While this Court has not attempted to 
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and 
some of the included things have been definitely stated.  Without doubt, it denotes not merely 
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”). 
 42. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) 
(O’Connor, Souter & Kennedy, JJ.) (basing the right to privacy on the word “liberty” in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating “[t]he controlling word in the cases before us 
is ‘liberty’”). 
10
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parents to raise their children in 1923.43  The Court first enforced the 
First Amendment’s prohibition on laws abridging freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press in 1931.44  The Supreme Court first upheld a 
person’s right to freedom of religion in 1940.45  The Supreme Court first 
defended a person’s freedom of procreation in 1942.46  The right to 
contraception followed in 1965,47 the right to marriage in 1967,48 a 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy in 1973,49 the right to live with 
extended family in 1977,50 and the right to die in 1990.51  Why did it 
take so long for the Court to recognize these rights?  Why did it take 
until 2003 for a majority of the Supreme Court to announce the simple, 
straightforward principle that people have the right to make “intimate 
and personal choices” involving sex, marriage, raising children, and 
living arrangements?52  The answer to that question depends not only 
upon an understanding of Slaughterhouse, but an understanding of 
Bradwell as well.  I now turn to that case. 
 
 43. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down Nebraska law prohibiting the 
teaching of foreign languages in the lower grades). 
 44. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (reversing conviction of defendant 
charged with violating a California statute that prohibited displaying a red flag as an emblem of 
opposition to organized government); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down 
Minnesota law which authorized the issuance of an injunction against the publication of defamatory 
newspapers). 
 45. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing defendant’s conviction for 
breach of the peace for playing a phonograph record expressing his religious beliefs). 
 46. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down Oklahoma mandatory 
sterilization law for “habitual criminals”). 
 47. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down Connecticut law 
prohibiting the use of birth control). 
 48. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia law criminalizing 
interracial marriage). 
 49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down Texas law prohibiting abortion 
except to save the life of the woman). 
 50. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down city ordinance 
narrowly defining the classes of family members who may live together in a home located in an area 
zoned for “single-family” residences). 
 51. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing the right 
of a competent adult to refuse lifesaving medical treatment). 
 52. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (Kennedy, J.) (“These matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.))). 
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III.  BRADWELL V. ILLINOIS 
The Court decided Bradwell the same day as Slaughterhouse, and 
the reasoning in Bradwell relied upon and reinforced the legal theories 
developed in Slaughterhouse.  But unlike Slaughterhouse, in Bradwell 
the Supreme Court came to an unjust result. 
Myra Bradwell was an accomplished legal publisher who stood for 
the bar in the State of Illinois.53  The Illinois Supreme Court rejected her 
application on the ground that she was a woman even though the state 
statute governing admission to the bar referred to “persons” and made no 
distinction upon gender lines.54  The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that 
the law had been intended to permit only men, and not women, to enter 
the legal profession,55 and it turned down Bradwell’s application to be a 
lawyer.56 
On appeal, the majority of the United States Supreme Court noted 
that Bradwell had no claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
because, as the Court had just ruled in Slaughterhouse, her right to earn 
a living was a fundamental right under state law, not national law, and 
accordingly she must look to the State of Illinois for redress of that 
right.57 
It may be surprising to modern readers that the Court did not 
specifically discuss Bradwell’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause.  
However, the Court had discussed Equal Protection in Slaughterhouse, 
and it incorporated its reasoning from Slaughterhouse into its opinion in 
Bradwell.58  In Slaughterhouse the Court found “the one pervading 
purpose” of the 14th Amendment to be the protection of “the freedom of 
 
 53. See Richard L. Aynes, Bradwell v. Illinois: Chief Justice’s Dissent and the “Sphere of 
Women’s Work,” 59 LA. L. REV. 521, 525 (1999); see also id. at 537-38 (constructing a dissenting 
opinion that Chief Justice Salmon Chase might have written in Bradwell in light of his values and 
the role that his daughter played in his life and career). 
 54. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131-33 (1873). 
 55. Id. at 132-33. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 139.  The Court stated: 
The opinion just delivered in the Slaughter-House Cases renders elaborate argument in 
the present case unnecessary; for, unless we are wholly and radically mistaken in the 
principles on which those cases are decided, the right to control and regulate the granting 
of license to practice law in the courts of a State is one of those powers which are not 
transferred for its protection to the Federal government, and its exercise is in no manner 
governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such 
license. 
Id. 
 58. See id. (“It is unnecessary to repeat the argument on which the judgment in 
[Slaughterhouse Cases] is founded.  It is sufficient to say they are conclusive of the present case.”). 
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the slave race.”59  The Court expressed the opinion that Framers 
intended the Equal Protection Clause to protect African-Americans – but 
no other groups – from discrimination: 
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way 
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their 
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It 
is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong 
case would be necessary for its application to any other.60 
Accordingly, the majority in Bradwell relied entirely upon the 
Court’s reasoning in Slaughterhouse in rejecting Bradwell’s 14th 
Amendment claim. 
Justice Joseph P. Bradley’s concurring opinion in Bradwell, 
however, articulated a different legal theory which has affected 
constitutional analysis ever since.  Bradley concluded that the inequality 
of women is not simply a matter of the law of Illinois or even the law of 
man – it is the law of God.61  In a passage from his opinion which 
deserves to be repeated in full because it represents a prejudice that we 
must be vigilant against, Bradley stated: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.  
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.  The natural 
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex 
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.  The 
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine 
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic 
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of 
womanhood.  The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views 
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant 
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from 
that of her husband.  So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders 
of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of 
jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her 
 
 59. 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873) (Miller, J.).  Justice Miller stated: 
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, 
lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even 
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of 
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the 
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. 
Id. 
 60. Id. at 81. 
 61. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social 
state; and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil 
status, many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent 
upon this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most States.  One 
of these is, that a married woman is incapable, without her husband’s 
consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or him.  
This very incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court 
of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman 
incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the 
office of an attorney and counsellor . . . . 
 
The humane movements of modern society, which have for their object 
the multiplication of avenues for woman's advancement, and of 
occupations adapted to her condition and sex, have my heartiest 
concurrence.  But I am not prepared to say that it is one of her 
fundamental rights and privileges to be admitted into every office and 
position, including those which require highly special qualifications 
and demanding special responsibilities.  In the nature of things it is not 
every citizen of every age, sex, and condition that is qualified for every 
calling and position.  It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe 
regulations founded on nature, reason, and experience for the due 
admission of qualified persons to professions and callings demanding 
special skill and confidence.  This fairly belongs to the police power of 
the State; and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, 
destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the province of the 
legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled 
and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies 
and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are 
presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.62 
Justice Bradley’s reasoning relies primarily upon tradition (“the 
civil law has always recognized a wide difference in the respective 
spheres and destinies of man and woman”) and religious doctrine 
(“founded in the divine ordinance”) in concluding that women should 
not be permitted to serve as lawyers.  It is this general jurisprudential 
approach which continues to hamper and constrain analysis of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Compare Justice Bradley’s reasoning in Bradwell 
with that of Chief Justice Warren Burger a century later in Bowers v. 
Hardwick,63 a gay rights case: 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Texas law criminalizing oral and anal sex as applied to 
same sex couples). 
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As the Court notes, the proscriptions against sodomy have very 
“ancient roots.”  Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual 
conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history 
of Western civilization.  Condemnation of those practices is firmly 
rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.  Homosexual 
sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law.  See Code Theod. 9.7.6; 
Code Just. 9.9.31.  See also D. Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western 
Christian Tradition 70-81 (1975).  During the English Reformation 
when powers of the ecclesiastical courts were transferred to the King’s 
Courts, the first English statute criminalizing sodomy was passed.  25 
Hen. VIII, ch. 6.  Blackstone described “the infamous crime against 
nature” as an offense of “deeper malignity” than rape, a heinous act 
“the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,” and “a 
crime not fit to be named.”  The common law of England, including its 
prohibition of sodomy, became the received law of Georgia and the 
other Colonies.  In 1816 the Georgia Legislature passed the statute at 
issue here, and that statute has been continuously in force in one form 
or another since that time.  To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy 
is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside 
millennia of moral teaching.64 
Compare, as well, Justice Scalia’s reasoning from his dissenting 
opinion in United States v. Virginia,65 where he argued that the 
Commonwealth of Virginia had the right to exclude women from 
attending a prestigious state university.  Justice Scalia commenced his 
opinion with an inaccurate charge and an appeal to history:  “Today the 
Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century 
and a half.”66  The Supreme Court, of course, did not “shut down” the 
Virginia Military Institute, it merely ordered the Commonwealth of 
Virginia to admit women to the Institute.67  Justice Scalia repeatedly 
invoked “tradition” as justifying the state’s egregious gender 
discrimination, for example stating, “[the Court] counts for nothing the 
long tradition, enduring down to the present, of men’s military colleges 
supported by both States and the Federal Government.”68  Justice Scalia 
closed his opinion with a long quotation from “The Code of the 
Gentleman,” a booklet that VMI students had been required to keep in 
 
 64. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 65. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down official policy barring women from Virginia Military 
Institute). 
 66. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 557 (Ginsburg, J.). 
 68. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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their possession at all times.69  This booklet, which Justice Scalia 
apparently found reflected a tradition of “manly honor,”70 was filled with 
romanticized notions of etiquette towards women: 
A Gentleman . . . Does not speak more than casually about his girl 
friend.  Does not go to a lady’s house if he is affected by alcohol. . . . 
Does not hail a lady from a club window. . . . [N]ever discusses the 
merits or demerits of a lady. . . . Does not . . . so much as lay a finger 
on a lady . . . .”71 
Justice Scalia concluded: 
I do not know whether the men of VMI lived by this code; perhaps not.  
But it is powerfully impressive that a public institution of higher 
education still in existence sought to have them do so.  I do not think 
any of us, women included, will be better off for its destruction.”72 
In his opinion in the VMI case, Justice Scalia summarized his 
approach to constitutional analysis in this brief statement:  “It is my 
position that the term ‘fundamental rights’ should be limited to 
‘interest[s] traditionally protected by our society.’”73  More specifically, 
Justice Scalia explained: 
[I]n my view the function of this Court is to preserve our society's 
values regarding (among other things) equal protection, not to revise 
them; to prevent backsliding from the degree of restriction the 
Constitution imposed upon democratic government, not to prescribe, 
on our own authority, progressively higher degrees.  For that reason it 
is my view that, whatever abstract tests we may choose to devise, they 
cannot supersede – and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect – 
those constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the 
people’s understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts.  More 
specifically, it is my view that “when a practice not expressly 
prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a 
long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates 
back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for 
striking it down.”74 
The “tradition” approach favored by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Scalia is entirely consistent with Justice Bradley’s reasoning in 
 
 69. Id. at 601-02. 
 70. Id. at 601. 
 71. United States v. Virginia,  518 U.S. 515, 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 603. 
 73. Id. at 567. 
 74. Id. at 568. 
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Bradwell.  Traditional understandings of liberty and equality effectively 
strangle emerging constitutional claims by groups which have been 
traditionally discriminated against such as gays and women.  Similarly, 
tradition was also used to justify racial segregation in Plessy v. 
Ferguson,75 where the Court stated that in determining whether or not 
people could be segregated by race on trains, the State of Louisiana was 
entitled to act in accordance with “the established usages, customs, and 
traditions of the people.”76 
It took 98 years for the Supreme Court to rectify its decision in 
Bradwell.  As late as 1948, the Court sustained a state law that 
prohibited a woman from working in a tavern unless the tavern was 
owned by her husband or her father.77  The first time that the Supreme 
Court found any law to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
because it discriminated on the basis of gender was 1971, in the case of 
Reed v. Reed.78  Other groups who have been traditionally discriminated 
against waited even longer for the Court to acknowledge their equality.  
Not until 1996 did the Court for the first time strike down a law because 
it discriminated against people on the basis of sexual orientation,79 and 
not until 2003 did the Court finally invalidate state laws making 
homosexuality a crime.80 
A majority of the Supreme Court has now rejected the “tradition” 
approach to defining constitutional rights advocated by Justice Bradley 
in Bradwell, Justice Brown in Plessy, Chief Justice Burger in Bowers, 
 
 75. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring segregation of the races on 
trains). 
 76. Id. at 550.  The Court stated: 
So far, then, as a conflict with the fourteenth amendment [sic] is concerned, the case 
reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, 
and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the 
legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with 
reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a 
view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and 
good order. 
Id. 
 77. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan law prohibiting women 
from working as a bartender in a tavern unless they were “the wife or daughter of the male owner”). 
 78. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down Idaho statute which favored males over females in the 
appointment of administrators of estates). 
 79. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado constitutional 
amendment prohibiting the adoption of laws or official policies directed against discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation). 
 80. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas statute making oral and 
anal sex between persons of the same gender a crime). 
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and Justice Scalia in VMI.81  Justice Anthony Kennedy has stated, 
“[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the 
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”82  Justice O’Connor 
has stated that she would not “foreclose the unanticipated” by adopting a 
strictly historical approach to constitutional analysis.83  In Lawrence v. 
Texas, the Court expressly adopted the language proposed by Justice 
Stevens from his Bowers dissent, stating: 
[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for 
upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition 
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional 
attack.84 
In place of tradition the Supreme Court has adopted a realistic 
standard for defining the concepts of “liberty” and “equality” under the 
Constitution.  In defining “liberty,” the Court now takes two factors into 
account: (1) How important is this behavior in the life of the individual – 
how “intimate and personal” is that choice? and (2) How much harm is 
this behavior likely to cause?85  The principal definition of “liberty” was 
given expression by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence v. Texas: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State.86 
 
 81. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging that the majority of the Court does not agree with his tradition approach). 
 82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 83. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (“I 
would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical 
analysis.”). 
 84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 85.  See id. at 572, 577-78. 
 86. Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)). 
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Justice Kennedy also took particular care to imply that the activity 
upon which the claim of constitutional right was centered must not be 
causing harm: 
The present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships 
where consent might not easily be refused.  It does not involve public 
conduct or prostitution.87 
Similarly, constitutional standards regarding equality are no longer 
based primarily upon tradition and certainly not upon religious 
teachings.88  The legal standard that comes closest to a realistic 
definition of equality was first announced in 1885 in the case of Barbier 
v. Connelly,89 in which the Court stated: 
Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is 
prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is 
limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects 
alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.90 
A year later, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,91 the Supreme Court quoted 
this language and applied this principle in ruling that the City of San 
Francisco acted illegally when it denied permits to operate laundries to 
persons of Chinese extraction.92  The “similarly situated test” from this 
case has been widely quoted and used in Equal Protection cases.93  Even 
Justice William Rehnquist agreed in his opinions that the constitutional 
principle of equality demands that “persons [who are] similarly situated 
should be treated similarly.”94 
 
 87. Id. at 578. 
 88. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“A 
State can no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish such 
behavior because of racial animus.”). 
 89. 113 U.S. 27 (1885). 
 90. Id. at 32. 
 91. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down discriminatory enforcement of municipal ordinance 
issuing permits for the operation of laundries). 
 92. Id. at 368. 
 93. See id. at 373-74. 
 94. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Rehnquist stated: 
In the case of equality and equal protection, the constitutional principle – the thing to be 
protected to a greater or lesser degree – is not even identifiable from within the four 
corners of the Constitution.  For equal protection does not mean that all persons must be 
treated alike.  Rather, its general principle is that persons similarly situated should be 
treated similarly. 
Id. at 779-80. 
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In his concurring opinion in Railway Express Agency v. New 
York,95 Justice Robert Jackson illustrated how to apply this realistic 
approach to Equal Protection questions.  The issue in that case 
concerned the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance which 
prohibited the operation of motor vehicles on the streets of New York 
solely for the purposes of advertising.96  The law permitted advertising 
on vehicles which were operated for other purposes.97  Justice Jackson 
gave the following reason for joining the decision of the majority 
upholding the law: 
The question in my mind comes to this.  Where individuals contribute 
to an evil or danger in the same way and to the same degree, may those 
who do so for hire be prohibited, while those who do so for their own 
commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue?  I think the 
answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and 
may be dealt with differently than those who act on their own.  But this 
is not merely because such a discrimination will enable the lawmaker 
to diminish the evil.  That might be done by many classifications, 
which I should think wholly unsustainable.  It is rather because there is 
a real difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so 
that it is one thing to tolerate action from those who act on their own 
and it is another thing to permit the same action to be promoted for a 
price.98 
The “real differences” test articulated by Justice Jackson is simply 
the reverse side of the “similarly situated” coin.  Groups of persons who 
are similarly situated must be treated similarly.  Groups of persons may 
be treated differently only if there are “real differences” between them, 
and only if those differences “have an appropriate relation to the object 
of the legislation or ordinance.”99 
In the interpretation of the Constitution, we now stand on firmer 
ground than did the Court in Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, Plessy, and 
Bowers.  Tradition is still an important consideration in constitutional 
analysis, but it is not the only determinant, nor is it controlling.  In 
assessing our constitutionally protected sphere of liberty to engage in 
certain activity, in addition to tradition, we look to the importance of the 
activity to the individual as well as to the harm that may result from the 
 
 95. 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding municipal ordinance regulating advertisements on 
vehicles against equal protection challenge). 
 96. Id. at 107. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 115-16 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 115 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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individual’s actions.  In defining equality, we consider not only tradition 
but also whether the group of people whom the law is treating differently 
is similar to or different from other groups in the context of the law 
being challenged.  Most importantly, we no longer regard fundamental 
rights to liberty and equality as aspects of state citizenship rather than 
national citizenship.  No longer are the States considered to be the 
repositories, and more frequently the graveyards, of human rights. 
In the third case which is the subject of this conference, United 
States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court inflicted even more damage to 
the Constitution and to the cause of human rights than it had in 
Slaughterhouse and Bradwell.  The Court reached an even more unjust 
result, and its reasoning was even more twisted.  The discussion of 
Cruikshank follows. 
IV.  UNITED STATES V. CRUIKSHANK 
This case weighed an appeal from the conviction of three 
individuals on federal charges resulting from the mass murder known as 
the Colfax Massacre.100  The underlying facts of the case and the 
miscarriage of justice that the Supreme Court authored in their opinion 
reversing the defendants’ convictions are ably set forth in Charles Lane’s 
The Day Freedom Died: The Colfax Massacre, The Supreme Court and 
the Betrayal of Reconstruction.101 
Briefly, following the election of 1872, the Democratic Party of 
Louisiana attempted to steal the election by means of fraud and 
intimidation.102  The Republican Party – African-Americans and their 
supporters – resisted these efforts in one parish by occupying the 
courthouse in Colfax.103  On April 13, 1873, a large mob of whites 
attacked the courthouse and killed over 60 persons, mostly African-
Americans, in cold blood, most of them after they surrendered.104  Only 
 
 100. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548-49 (1876). 
 101. CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008). 
 102. See id. at 65-66. 
 103. See id. at 70. 
 104. See Charles Lane, To Keep and Bear Arms, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2008, at A13, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR200803210 
2540.html; see also Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The Second Amendment, the Slaughter-House 
Cases, and United States v. Cruikshank, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 365, 387 (2008) (stating that 
between 100 and 400 individuals were killed in the attack). 
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three of the attackers were convicted,105 and these three were not 
convicted of murder but rather for violating a statute which Congress 
had enacted in 1870 that made it a crime for individuals to conspire to 
interfere with any rights of American citizens under the Constitution or 
under federal laws.106  The Supreme Court reversed the defendants’ 
convictions under this statute because the indictments failed to 
sufficiently allege that the defendants violated rights protected under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.107 
The Court began its consideration of the legality of the indictments 
and resulting convictions with an extended discussion of the principal 
theory that it had announced in Slaughterhouse and applied in Bradwell 
– the distinction between state and national citizenship.108  The Court 
stated: 
We have in our political system a government of the United States and 
a government of each of the several States.  Each one of these 
governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its 
own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it 
must protect.  The same person may be at the same time a citizen of 
the United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship 
under one of these governments will be different from those he has 
under the other.109 
The Court elaborated upon this theory and concluded that citizens 
might seek the federal government’s protection from encroachments on 
their national rights, but they must seek the state government’s 
protection from violations of their rights derived from state 
citizenship.110 
 
 105. See Lane, supra note 104 (“No one was ever punished for the Colfax Massacre.  [U.S. 
Attorney James] Beckwith secured only three convictions, and they were later overturned by the 
Supreme Court in one of the worst miscarriages of justice in American history.”). 
 106. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548 (1876) (quoting Section 6 of the federal 
Enforcement Act of 1870).  The Act provided: 
That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the 
public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of 
this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or 
hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him 
by the constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the 
same, such persons shall be held guilty of felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court . . . . 
Id. 
 107. See id. at 551-57. 
 108. See id. at 549-51. 
 109. Id. at 549. 
 110. See id. at 551.  The Court concluded: 
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The trial court convicted defendants on sixteen counts of the 
indictment which consisted of eight different charges relating to two 
victims of the massacre.111  The first and ninth counts of the indictment 
charged the defendants with interfering with the victims’ right to 
peaceably assemble.112  The Supreme Court concluded that Congress 
lacked the authority to protect this particular right because it was a 
matter which was committed to the States: 
The first amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress from 
abridging ‘the right of the people to assemble and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.’  This, like the other 
amendments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended 
to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their own 
citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone . . . . They 
left the authority of the States just where they found it, and added 
nothing to the already existing powers of the United States. 
 
The particular amendment now under consideration assumes the 
existence of the right of the people to assemble for lawful purposes, 
and protects it against encroachment by Congress.  The right was not 
created by the amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed, 
except as against congressional interference.  For their protection in its 
enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the States.  The power 
for that purpose was originally placed there, and it has never been 
surrendered to the United States.113 
The third and eleventh counts of the indictment alleged that the 
defendants conspired to deprive the victims of life and liberty without 
due process of law.114  At this point, the Court, for the first time in 
constitutional history, invoked what has become known as the “state 
action” doctrine.  The Court based this theory upon the previous 
distinction it constructed between state and national citizenship.  The 
Court stated: 
 
The government of the United States is one of delegated powers alone.  Its authority is 
defined and limited by the Constitution.  All powers not granted to it by that instrument 
are reserved to the States or the people.  No rights can be acquired under the constitution 
or laws of the United States, except such as the government of the United States has the 
authority to grant or secure.  All that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the 
protection of the States. 
Id. 
 111. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548 (1876). 
 112. Id. at 551. 
 113. Id. at 552. 
 114. Id. at 553. 
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The very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union 
under the Constitution, was to protect all persons within their 
boundaries in the enjoyment of these ‘unalienable rights with which 
they were endowed by their Creator.’  Sovereignty, for this purpose, 
rests alone with the States.  It is no more the duty or within the power 
of the United States to punish for a conspiracy to falsely imprison or 
murder within a State, than it would be to punish for false 
imprisonment or murder itself. 
 
The fourteenth amendment (sic) prohibits a State from depriving any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this 
adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.  It simply 
furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the 
States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a 
member of society.115 
In essence, the Court ruled that the defendants’ convictions had to 
be reversed because the conduct of the defendants constituted private 
action and not state action.  Accordingly, it was for the States, and not 
the federal government, to punish their behavior. 
Other scholars and I have written about how the Framers of the 
14th Amendment were, in fact, primarily concerned with addressing the 
practices of racial discrimination by private parties and the many acts of 
private violence being visited upon blacks and their white allies in the 
South116 – how Congress enacted statute after statute prohibiting that 
discrimination and punishing that violence117 – and how Congress 
adopted the 14th Amendment with the avowed purpose of making that 
 
 115. Id. at 553-54. 
 116. See B.F. Butler, To Protect Loyal and Peaceable Citizens of the United States, H.R. Rep. 
No. 41-37, at 1-4 (1871) (describing dozens of assaults and murders of blacks and their white allies 
across the South).  The Report stated: 
If . . . the State is powerless to prevent such murders and felonies . . . from being daily 
and hourly committed . . . , and if, added to that, comes the inability of the State to 
punish the crimes after they are committed, then the State has, by its neglect or want of 
power, deprived the citizens of the United States of protection in the enjoyment of life, 
liberty, and property. . . . 
Id. at 4. 
 117. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 
(2000)) (originally entitled “An Act to protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, 
and furnish the Means of their Vindication”); Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000)) (originally entitled “An Act to enforce the 
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other 
Purposes”); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 335 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1984 
(2000)) (originally entitled “An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights”). 
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legislation constitutional.118  After all of their efforts – after the terrible 
struggle of the Civil War and the immense suffering their generation 
endured to bring a new birth of freedom to America119 – the Supreme 
Court struck down the Civil Rights Acts adopted by the Reconstruction 
Congress on the ground that Congress lacked authority to punish the acts 
of private parties. 
The Court’s ruling on state action in Cruikshank certainly did not 
accord with the understanding of the Framers.  The Republican members 
of Congress articulated this principal theory: “Allegiance and protection 
are reciprocal rights.”120  They believed that citizens owe allegiance to 
their government because (and to the extent that) the government affords 
them protection.121  The Framers of the 14th Amendment enacted 
 
 118. See infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text. 
 119. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, President, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1865).  Lincoln 
stated: 
One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over 
the Union, but localized in the southern part of it.  These slaves constituted a peculiar 
and powerful interest.  All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war.  To 
strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents 
would rend the Union even by war, while the Government claimed no right to do more 
than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it.  Neither party expected for the war the 
magnitude or the duration which it has already attained . . . . 
Id. 
 120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumball, 
floor manager of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Trumball said: 
How is it that every person born in these United States owes allegiance to the 
Government? . . . [C]an it be that our ancestors struggled through a long war and set up 
this Government, and that the people of our day have struggled through another war, 
with all its sacrifices and all its desolation, to maintain it, and at last that we have got a 
Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of the citizen, but has no 
power to afford him protection? . . . Sir, it cannot be.  Such is not the meaning of our 
Constitution.  Such is not the meaning of American citizenship.  This government, . . . 
has certainly some power to protect its own citizens in their own country.  Allegiance 
and protection are reciprocal rights. 
Id. 
 121. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866) (remarks of Rep. John H. 
Broomal).  Broomal said: 
But throwing aside the letter of the Constitution, there are characteristics of 
Governments that belong to them as such, without which they would cease to be 
Governments.  The rights and duties of allegiance and protection are corresponding 
rights and duties.  Upon whatever square foot of the earth’s surface I owe allegiance to 
my country, there it owes me protection, and wherever my Government owes me no 
protection I owe it no allegiance and can commit no treason. 
Id.  A leading congressional Republican quoted Daniel Webster, a leading Whig and ardent 
Unionist, for the proposition that there is a reciprocal relation between “allegiance” and 
“protection.”  See Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1871) (John Bingham quoted Daniel 
Webster as having said, “[t]he maintenance of the Constitution does not depend on the plighted faith 
of the States as States to support it . . . . It relies on individual duty and obligation. . . . On the other 
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legislation to protect American citizens in their fundamental rights from 
interference either by the states or by private parties, and they adopted 
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to remove any possible doubts about 
the constitutionality of that legislation.122  The Supreme Court rejected 
the Framers’ political philosophy when they ruled that the States, and 
not the national government, had responsibility for protecting citizens in 
their fundamental rights.  The Court betrayed the intent of the Framers 
when they declared the civil rights laws enacted by the Reconstruction 
Congress unconstitutional.123 
The Cruikshank Court found that other counts of the indictment 
similarly failed to allege that the defendants deprived the victims of any 
federal rights.  For example, the Court ruled that separate charges of the 
indictment were insufficient because they neglected to specify whether 
the defendants assaulted the victims because they voted in elections for 
national office as opposed to elections for state office,124 or because the 
indictments failed to allege that the defendants assaulted the victims 
“because of the race or color of the persons conspired against.”125  The 
 
hand, the Government owes high and solemn duties to every citizen of the country.  It is bound to 
protect him in his most important rights and interests.”).  See also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA 
SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 430-33 (2d ed. 2005) (describing the 
Republican Party’s linkage of allegiance and protection); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional 
Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 
740 (2003); Alan R. Madry, State Action and the Due Process of Self-Help; Flagg Bros. Redux, 62 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 40 (2000); Wilson Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of 
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1403-04 (2006). 
 122. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 553-54 (1991) (noting that John Bingham, the leading 
drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other Republicans, considered the adoption of the 
Amendment as ensuring the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866); see also Aynes, 
supra note 15, at 631; Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of John A. Bingham and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 610 (2003); FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME 
COURT’S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: A DISTORTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
78-79 (2000). 
 123. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26-27 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (taking the 
position that the majority of the Court had erred in striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on 
state action grounds and stating, “the court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with which they 
were adopted.”).  See generally Huhn, supra note 121, at 1430-43 (assembling authorities 
supporting the proposition that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to clothe 
Congress with the authority to prohibit individuals from interfering with the fundamental rights of 
American citizens). 
 124. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1875) (“There is nothing to show that the 
elections voted at were any other than State elections . . . .”). 
 125. Id. at 554. 
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Court also found that some charges of the indictment were 
unconstitutionally vague.126 
The cruel and heedless result reached by the Court in Cruikshank 
signaled open season on blacks and other racial minorities.127  The 
decision in Cruikshank prevented the federal government from 
protecting black voters from violence.  This initiated a shameful period 
in American history – the Jim Crow era – in which the Court was fully 
complicit.128  In numerous decisions between 1896 and 1927, the Court 
narrowly construed the constitutional rights of African-Americans and 
other racial and ethnic minorities, upholding state laws that fostered 
racial segregation and other discriminatory policies.129  Not only did the 
Court refuse to enforce the principle of equality implicit in the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, but it also refused to let 
Congress enforce this principle.  In some cases the Court misconstrued 
federal civil rights legislation as it had in Cruikshank.130  In other cases 
the Court simply declared federal civil rights laws unconstitutional, 
usually invoking the state action doctrine it had formulated in 
 
 126. Id. at 557-59. 
 127. See Douglas Linder, Lynchings: By State and Race, 1882-1968, 
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingsstate.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2009) (citing statistics provided by the Archives at Tuskegee Institute showing large numbers of 
lynchings in the period following Cruikshank); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF 
JIM CROW 43 (1966) (“[I]t was, after all, in the ’eighties and early ’nineties [of the 19th century] 
that lynching attained the most staggering proportions ever reached in the history of that crime.”); 
see also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 560-61 (1944) (describing lynching in 
America, almost all of which occurred in the southern and border states); Douglas Linder, The Trial 
of Joseph Schipp, et al.: An Account, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ 
ftrials/shipp/trialaccount.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (describing the 1906 lynching of Ed 
Johnson in Tennessee and the subsequent trial of Sheriff Joseph Schipp and other members of the 
mob in the United States Supreme Court for criminal contempt). 
 128. See WOODWARD, supra note 127, at 70-71 (“[T]he cumulative weakening of resistance to 
racism was expressed also in a succession of decisions by the United States Supreme Court between 
1873 and 1898 . . . .”). 
 129. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring 
separate railroad cars for blacks and whites); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) 
(upholding provisions of Mississippi constitution and laws such as poll tax, literacy test, 
disqualification for certain crimes, and residency requirements, which were designed to disqualify 
African-Americans from voting); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (upholding Mississippi 
statute requiring separation of the races in the public schools). 
 130. See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1872) (Strong, J.) (giving Section 3 of Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 narrow construction, denying jurisdiction of federal court to hear murder case 
where Kentucky law prohibited blacks from testifying as witnesses to crimes committed by whites, 
viz., the murder of an elderly black woman witnessed by members of her family); United States v. 
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (Waite, C.J.) (construing Section 3 of the first Enforcement Act broadly, 
so as to render it unconstitutional as beyond Congress’s power to enact under the Fifteenth 
Amendment). 
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Cruikshank.131  By this series of decisions the Court enabled state-
sponsored segregation,132 inferior educational programs,133 “anti-
miscegenation” statutes,134 lynching,135 and loss of the right to vote136 for 
African-Americans. 
Not until 1938 did the Supreme Court, fortified with two justices 
newly appointed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt,137 begin to strike down 
the system of state-sponsored segregation that the Court had helped to 
 
 131. See Harris v. United States, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883) (Wood, J.) (declaring provision of 
Ku Klux Klan Act unconstitutional).  Justice Wood stated: 
As, therefore, the section of the law under consideration is directed exclusively against 
the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State or their 
administration by her officers, we are clear in the opinion that it is not warranted by any 
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
Id.; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down federal Civil Rights Act of 
1875); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) (following Harris in finding the Ku Klux Klan Act 
to be unconstitutional insofar as it applies to private action); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 
(1906) (Brewer, J.) (overturning convictions of a group of individuals for interfering with the civil 
rights of other individuals in violation of Civil Rights Act of 1866, in part because the statute could 
not be grounded upon the Fourteenth Amendment, stating, “that the 14th and 15th Amendments do 
not justify the legislation is also beyond dispute, for they, as repeatedly held, are restrictions upon 
state action, and no action on the part of the state is complained of.”); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down federal Violence Against Women Act as applied to private acts 
of gender violence). 
 132. See WOODWARD, supra note 127, at 145 (stating that in the early 1950s “[s]egregation 
was required by law in the schools of seventeen states and the District of Columbia, permitted by 
local option in four, prohibited by law in sixteen, and eleven states had no laws on the subject.”). 
 133. See id. (stating that in the early 1950s “in many areas Negro schools were disgracefully 
behind schools for whites.”); see also Cumming v. Bd. of Educ. of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528 
(1899) (refusing to issue an injunction against local authorities who had closed the separate 
secondary school for African-Americans while continuing to operate a school for white students). 
 134. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law 
that punished interracial marriage or living arrangements).  The law provided: 
[I]f any white person and any negro, or the descendant of any negro to the third 
generation, inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation was a white person, 
intermarry or live in adultery or fornication with each other, each of them must, on 
conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary or sentenced to hard labor for the county 
for not less than two nor more than seven years. 
Id. at 583. 
 135. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 136. See WOODWARD, supra note 127, at 71 (“[I]n Williams v. Mississippi the Court completed 
the opening of the legal road to proscription, segregation, and disenfranchisement by approving the 
Mississippi plan for depriving Negroes of the franchise.”). 
 137. Hugo Black joined the Court on August 19, 1937, and Stanley Reed was added on January 
31, 1938.  See Oyez Project, Hugo L. Black Biography, http://www.oyez.org/justices /hugo_l_black 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2009); Oyez Project, Stanley Reed Biography, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/stanley_reed (last visited Jan. 31, 2009); see also Oyez Project, 
http://www.oyez.org/courts/warren/war1 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (listing Justices from the first 
term of the Warren Court). 
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erect.138  Not until 1954 did the Supreme Court, with five members 
appointed by Roosevelt,139 declare “separate but equal” to be inherently 
unequal and unconstitutional.140  And not until 1964 did Congress enact 
and the Supreme Court uphold major civil rights legislation, this time 
under the Commerce Clause.141 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and 
Cruikshank had a devastating effect on human rights under the 
Constitution.  Our basic liberties were placed at the mercy of state laws 
and state officials.  Equality was defined primarily by reference to 
tradition, a tradition which was all too often intolerant.  And Congress 
was prevented from enacting legislation that would have protected 
people in their basic rights. 
Thank goodness the reasoning of those cases has largely been 
circumvented or overruled.  Even though Slaughterhouse emasculated 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the evolving doctrine of 
Substantive Due Process has served to make both the Bill of Rights and 
the Right to Privacy effective against the States.142  Even though 
Slaughterhouse and Bradwell eviscerated the Equal Protection Clause, 
limiting its application to race alone and defining equality as no more 
than traditional conceptions of human potential, today Equal Protection 
applies to all classes of persons and equality is measured realistically by 
reference to how similar or how different groups of people really are.  
Furthermore, our right to liberty is also no longer limited by tradition but 
 
 138. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (ordering the School of Law 
of the State University of Missouri to admit an African-American student). 
 139. Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, and William Douglas were 
all appointed by Roosevelt and were still members of the Court in May 1954.  See Oyez Project, 
http://www.oyez.org/courts/warren/war1 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (listing Justices from the first 
term of the Warren Court). 
 140. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of 
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”). 
 141. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 142. See David Bogen, Mr. Justice Miller’s Clause: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of 
the United States Internationally, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1051, 1053-54 (2008) (“The Supreme Court is 
unlikely to alter Justice Miller’s interpretation of the Clause because overturning it would serve 
little purpose.  By interpreting the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses broadly to attack racial 
discrimination, to enforce guarantees of the Bill of Rights against the States, and to apply 
fundamental rights limitations, the Court has achieved the results that an expansive reading of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause would reach.”). 
29
Huhn: The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
HUHN_COPYFORPRINTER_FINAL.DOC 6/30/2009  3:35 PM 
1080 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1051 
rather depends upon how important an activity is to an individual and 
whether that activity is causing harm.  As Thurgood Marshall 
admonished in United States v. Kras,143 “[i]t is perfectly proper for 
judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires.  But it is 
disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon 
unfounded assumptions about how people live.”144  Finally, although the 
Supreme Court in Cruikshank commenced its vocation of narrowly 
interpreting and striking down civil rights acts as unauthorized under 
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, Congress has found other 
constitutional sources of authority besides the 14th Amendment which 
authorize it to adopt civil rights legislation.  The baneful legacy of 
Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank has nearly run its course. 
 
 143. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
 144. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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